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MEASURING NEED SATISFACTION 
 
     In Part II we have argued that basic needs exist which are 
objective and universal but our understanding of which changes, 
and typically expands, through time.  We also recognised that 
these needs are met by innumerable specific satisfiers, which do 
vary across cultures. Here, we must again address the many 
problems which flow from this duality of universality and 
particularity. Can we articulate what physical health and 
autonomy mean in terms which are universal yet measurable? What 
does optimising need satisfaction entail in practice? Can we 
devise measures which directly assess levels of satisfaction? 
These are the sorts of questions asked in this chapter. None of 
them is novel.  Indeed, they have all been tackled in the 
rapidly-growing literature on 'social indicators', the 'basic 
needs approach' and the 'human development' concept. It is 
therefore with this body of literature that we begin our analysis 
of human needs in practice. 
Social indicators and other direct measures of human welfare 
     A diverse collection of empirical indicators designed to 
assess 'need satisfaction' is now commonly used throughout the 
world. Though these have older roots, the 1960's saw a new 
interest in direct non-monetary measures of well-being in the 
'First' and the 'Third' Worlds for both theoretical and practical 
reasons.  
     Theoretically this stemmed from dissatisfaction with 
national income as a measure of total product, let alone human 
welfare. Gross Domestic Product sums the net values added of 
those goods and services produced within the monetised sectors of 
an economy. In its unadjusted form it excludes peasant and other 
production for direct consumption (which can amount to 40% of 
total product in less developed economies) together with the vast 
range of unpaid activities and services performed chiefly by 
women within the domestic sphere (which can amount to 40% in the 
more developed economies). Yet as a measure of welfare GDP per 
head is still more deficient. It takes no account of the 
composition of output between need satisfiers and luxuries - 
between 'goods, bads and anti-bads', nor of the distribution of 
welfare between groups and within families, nor of the impact of 
production and consumption on human well-being (unless well-being 
is defined in terms of those things which GDP measures), nor of 
the side-effects of production on the environment and the 
biosphere and hence of the sustainability of future production 
and welfare [Miles, 1985, ch.2].   
     These deficiencies are well known - indeed they are in one 
sense misplaced as critiques in that GDP was not initially 
devised to measure either aggregate production or welfare. But 
during the last half century these inadequacies have led to the 
search for alternative measures of welfare [Miles, 1985, ch.2]. 
To begin with, Drewnowski and others associated with the UN 
Research Institute of Social Development developed the concept of 
'level of living' - direct measures of need satisfaction in 
various areas of life [Drwenowski and Scott, 198 , p.00]. This 
was subsequently theorised by other social scientists mainly in 
the Nordic countries. Von Wright [1963] developed the distinction 
between objective welfare and subjective happiness in this 
context. Allardt [1973] then broadened the approach from material 
level of living to embrace those aspects of life usually the 
subject of the personal and political realms. In this way he 
distinguished three fundamental dimensions of objective 
well-being - 'having', 'loving' and 'being' - while retaining the 
contrast with subjective well-being [see also Galtung, 1982].  
     These theoretical developments reflected, and contributed 
to, practical developments. In the First World, governments began 
to move on from Keynesian economic management to broader 
responsibilities for social planning, and this in turn required 
the construction of new statistics for modelling and control 
purposes. Social reporting was developed in the USA and spread 
via such publications as the British government's Social Trends. 
In 1973 the OECD identified a 'list of social concerns common to 
most member countries' and subsequently specified and constructed 
social indicators to monitor progress with respect to these 
concerns [OECD, 1976].  
     In the Third World in the 1960s and 1970s, respectable rates 
of growth in some regions failed to prevent worsening levels of 
relative and even absolute poverty, an experience which generated 
an explicit 'basic needs approach'. 'Economic growth', measured 
by rates of change in GDP, was criticised as an index of both 
'development' and 'welfare'. Attempts to chart the latter led 
eventually, via a focus on employment and income distribution, to 
an explicit concern with 'basic needs'. In 1976  the ILO adopted 
a Declaration of Principles and Programme of Action for a Basic 
Needs Strategy of Development, and in 1978 the World Bank 
initiated work on basic needs. These and other initiatives set in 
motion programmes to collect and collate indicators of basic need 
satisfaction, typically prioritising a small set of basic needs 
such as nutrition, primary education, health, water supply, 
sanitation and housing (1). Many advantages were claimed for the 
basic needs approach as both a goal and a set of policy 
priorities for Third World countries [Streeten, 1981, chs.18-19; 
Stewart, 1985, ch.1]. The goal was applicable to the concerns of 
all people and it was widely acceptable and hence appealing to 
international aid agencies. Above all it was morally sound: 
'putting basic needs first', some argued,  was closer to what 
should be the fundamental objectives of development. Trivial sums 
of money could be shown to relieve vast areas of suffering. As a 
means of prioritising policies in a context of limited resources 
it integrated separate issues into a coherent package, yet could 
justify concrete programmes for specific vulnerable groups.  
     Yet despite theoretical advances and political advantages 
the movement for social indicators and human development appears 
to have run into the sand. Politically, the social indicators 
movement was weakened in the 1980s, especially in the 
English-speaking world, by the rise of neo-liberalism. The 
resulting IMF-led policies of 'structural adjustment' in the 
Third World paid scant regard to basic needs, human development 
or quality of life [Cornia et al, 1987]. By the 1980s many 
countries were experiencing falling growth rates and spreading 
absolute poverty. At the same time the basic needs strategy was 
also criticised by Third World critics as being an imperialist 
riposte to their demand for a New International Economic Order. 
Instead they stressed the prior need for the underdeveloped 
nations to reduce their economic dependency on the West [Miles, 
1985, p.169].  
     Undoubtedly, the crises facing the international economy  
contributed to what some identified as a crisis facing the social 
indicators or 'human development' movement in both the South and 
the North. So too did the impracticality of some basic need 
strategies, the 'breathtaking innocence of socio-political 
reality' exhibited by some [Leeson and Nixson, 1988, p.34, cf. 
ch.2]. But well before this time the relativist wave, documented 
in Chapter 1, was eroding their conceptual foundations. The basic 
needs approach, it was argued, incorporated arbitrary postulates 
about human nature, in particular Western cultural values, and 
about social change, in particular a uniform, linear model of 
development. Instead an anthropological approach to evaluating 
quality of life was advocated, particularly among some Nordic 
theorists [    ]. This articulated more culture-bound concepts of 
'style of life' and 'way of life'. At the macro-level it entailed 
a greater emphasis on community and participation as ways of 
understanding the needs of particular social groups. In many 
ways, and in some hands [eg. Johansson, 1976], this represents a 
positive contribution to developing the sort of cross-cultural 
understanding of human need attempted in this book. However, 
elsewhere it has helped to discredit any notion of universal 
human need [    ]. 
     The decline and fall of the social indicator/human 
development movements has been due first and foremost to the lack 
of a unifying conceptual framework [cf. Sen, 1987, p.25]. The 
earlier theoretical innovations noted above all suffer from one 
over-riding defect. None of them demonstrates the universality of 
their theory, nor, the other side of the same coin, tackles the 
deeper philosophical questions raised by relativism. Either the 
very idea of a universal approach is rejected, as when Rist 
writes: 'Needs are constructed by the social structure and have 
no objective content' [Rist, 1980, p.241]. Or, more commonly, the 
theoretical possibility of universal needs is granted, but their 
concrete assessment is perceived as beyond reach due to the 
cultural and political bias of concepts and evidence (2). 
      Thus Galtung [1980, p.73] grants that basic human needs 
exist, but are 'perverted' or 'contaminated' by Western 
conceptions, categories and lists. We can approach the universal 
core only by generating alternative non-Western lists of needs. A 
universal list is a dangerous illusion, even though he holds out 
the prospect of getting closer to it via dialogue between 
contending lists. In the same vein, Carr-Hill begins from the 
recognition that 'measurent work and statistical work in general 
are not politically, socially or theoretically autonomous 
activities', and proceeds to a real fear that technical solutions 
can replace fundamentally political problems. 'There are then two 
possible consequences: either one does not construct indicators 
at all ("because they are ideological"), or one constructs those 
indicators most suited to one's political predilections' 
[Carr-Hill, 1984, pp.180,176]. He adopts the second approach, but 
cannot then gainsay any alternative system of indicators put 
forward by proponents of alternative value systems. Back to 
relativism. Yet it is not enough to attack relativism in the 
abstract and to argue for the existence of basic needs in theory. 
We must show what they entail in practice, especially the 
practice of applied social research.   
      
Satisfiers and 'Intermediate Needs' 
     While the basic individual needs for physical health and 
autonomy are universal, many goods and services required to 
satisfy these needs are culturally variable. For example, the 
needs for food and shelter apply to all peoples, but we have seen 
that there is a potentially infinite variety of cuisines and 
forms of dwelling which can meet any given specification of 
nutrition and protection from the elements. We have called all 
objects, activities and relationships which satisfy our basic 
needs 'satisfiers' [Kamenetzky, 1981, p.103]. Basic needs then 
are always universal but their satisfiers are often relative. Sen 
has made a similar point in his analysis of poverty: 'Poverty is 
an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often it 
will take a relative form in the space of commodities or 
characteristics' [1983,p.161]. The same point has been made by 
some contributors to the literature on basic needs and social 
indicators [eg. Lederer, 1980]. The existence of basic needs or 
capabilities which are universal to all people is quite 
consistent in theory with a rich variety of ways in which they 
can be met and a wide variation in the quantity of satisfiers 
required to meet them.  But to measure need satisfaction in 
practice further requirements are necessary.  
     In a series of papers Sen [1984, 1985, 1987] has developed a 
concept and measure of well-being with parallels to our own which 
contributes to this task. First, he draws a distinction between a 
commodity and its set of characteristics or desirable properties 
[Lancaster, 1966]. A meal, for example, may have the properties 
of satisfying hunger, establishing social contacts or providing a 
centre for family life. Conversely, a number of distinct 
commodities will often share one or more characteristics, as when 
all (or most) foodstuffs have the characteristic of satisfying 
hunger. Second, he argues that these characteristics must be 
distinguished from the 'functionings' of persons - what a 
particular person can achieve or succeed in doing with the set of 
commodity characteristics at her or his command.  The set of 
functionings which persons can choose - their 'freedom of choice' 
of functionings - he calls their 'capabilities'. Functionings and 
capabilities are in turn distinguished from the final state of 
mind of that person, such as happiness or desire-fulfilment. 
Hence Sen constructs an analysis of consumption and welfare, 
richer than that of orthodox economics, as follows: 
Commodities   Characteristics   Capabilities/Functionings   
Mental states 
     We propose to integrate Sen's framework with our own. His 
model suggests that there are two alternatives to either wealth 
(commodities) or utility (subjective end-states) as measures of 
well-being: 'capabilities/functionings' and 'characteristics'. 
Let us look at each in turn.  
     First, it is apparent that our basic needs for physical 
health and autonomy are closely related to functionings. But Sen 
can be criticised for not developing a systematic list of 
functionings and capabilities, despite his own helpful 
applications of his framework. It is just this which, we claim, 
our theory offers. The first task of operationalisation is thus 
directly to measure the degree of satisfaction of our basic 
individual needs using  cross-cultural measures. In Chapter 9 we 
show that considerable progress has been made in doing just that. 
Nevertheless, certain conceptual and empirical problems remain, 
which often leave us confronting a hard choice between 
universalisability and operationality. How can basic need 
satisfaction or 'objective welfare' be charted without either 
embracing relativism or working at such a level of generality 
that the relevance of our theory for specific problems concerning 
social policy is lost?   
     Second, as Sen suggests, to avoid this we must complement 
the first approach with one based on satisfiers and their 
characteristics.  'Satisfier characteristics' are a subset of all 
characteristics, having the property of contributing to the 
satisfaction of our basic needs in one or more cultural settings. 
Let us now subdivide this set further to identify universal 
satisfier characteristics: those characteristics of satisfiers 
which apply to all cultures. Universal satisfier characteristics 
are thus those properties of goods, services, activities and 
relationships which enhance physical health and human autonomy in 
all cultures.  For example, calories a day for a specified group 
of people constitutes a characteristic of (most) foodstuffs which 
has transcultural relevance. Similarly 'shelter from the 
elements' and 'protection from disease-carrying vectors' are 
characteristics which all dwellings have in common (though to 
greatly varying degrees). The category of universal satisfier 
characteristics thus provides the crucial bridge between 
universal basic needs and socially relative satisfiers.  
     Given the instrumental character of statements about human 
needs outlined in Chapter 3, universal satisfier characteristics 
can be regarded  as goals for which specific satisfiers can act 
as the means. For this reason, and because the phrase is less 
clumsy, let us refer to universal satisfier characteristics as 
intermediate needs. If this reasoning is correct, such needs can 
provide a secure foundation on which to erect a list of derived 
or second-order goals which must be achieved if the first-order 
goals of health and autonomy are to be attained.  As Braybrooke 
[1987, ch.2.2] points out, the construction of such lists is a 
common practice and there is a 'family of lists of needs' which 
have emerged from very different studies. However international 
organisations like the OECD, national governments and private 
individuals have all propounded different lists (3). Some items 
like food and water appear on all of them; others like 
'recreation' or 'command over goods and services' do not. The 
problem with such lists is their ad hoc character. By contrast, 
our theory dictates which intermediate needs are most important 
for basic need satisfaction, why this is so and why they are the 
same for all cultures. Intermediate needs can be grouped as 
follows:  
Nutritional food and clean water 
Protective housing 
A non-hazardous work environment 
A non-hazardous physical environment 
Appropriate health care 
A secure childhood 




Safe birth control and child-bearing 
     The only criterion for inclusion in this list is  whether or 
not any set of satisfier characteristics universally and 
positively contributes to physical health and autonomy.  If it 
does then it is classified as an intermediate need. If something 
is not universally necessary for enhanced basic need 
satisfaction, then it is not so classified, however widespread 
the commodity/activity/relationship may be. For example, 'sexual 
relationships' is not included in our list, because some people 
manage to live healthy and autonomous lives without 
inter-personal sex. Similarly, an item which is found to be 
harmful to health and autonomy in one social context (eg. 
high-rise housing in Britain) will not be included if in other 
societies it is not found to have this effect [see eg. Douglas, 
1983, pp.171-2]. 
     There is one partial exception to our definition of 
universal satisfier characteristics. Significant biological 
differences within the human species may occaision specific 
requirements for distinct satisfier characteristics. The most 
significant of such differences by far is the sex difference 
between men and women. We shall argue in Chapter 10 that this 
entails one further universal satisfier characteristic the 
satisfaction of which is essential to the health and autonomy of 
one half of the human race. Women require access to safe birth 
control and child-bearing if they are to enjoy the same 
opportunities to participate in their respective societies as 
men. 
     The evidence about what is universally necessary is derived 
from two principle scientific sources. First, there is the best 
available technical knowledge articulating causal relationships 
between physical health or autonomy and other factors. Second, 
there is comparative anthopological knowledge about practices in 
the numerous cultures and sub-cultures, states and political 
systems in the contemporary world [Braybrooke,1987, chs. 2.3, 
2.4; cf. Mallmann & Marcus, 1980]. Thus the understanding of both 
the natural and social sciences play their part in rationally 
determining the composition of intermediate needs. As we shall 
see, however, this is not to devalue the contribution of 
Habermas'  'practical'  understanding discussed in Chapter 7. 
     Like all taxonomies this list of intermediate needs is, in 
one sense, arbitrary. Its groups are 'verbal wrappings' or 
'labels' designed to demarcate one collection of characteristics 
from another. Moreover, the word-labels used will be ambiguous - 
they will 'not contain or exhaust the meaning of the need 
identified' [Judge, 1980, p.280]. Ambiguity can be reduced by 
increasing the numbers of characteristics or 'need categories'. 
Yet the larger the set, the greater the problems in comprehending 
the totality of human needs. Yet at the end of the day, the 
actual categories do not matter. Whatever the taxonomy, our 
theory requires that the sole condition for selection is the 
universality of the satisfier characteristics. 
     Thus we propose to measure need satisfaction defined in 
terms of (i) basic needs and (ii) intermediate needs. There is a 
third interpretation of need satisfaction, but it will feature 
infrequently in this volume. This entails measuring the 
consumption of specific satisfiers in a particular social 
context. To determine which satisfiers constitute necessities at 
a particular place and time requires distinct research 
methodologies pioneered by, for example, recent poverty research 
in Britain (4). In particular, codified knowledge needs to be 
complemented by a rich input of experiential knowledge from the 
people living the particular lives under investigation. Some of 
these issues will be broached in our concluding chapter, and the 
poverty research is partially utilised in Chapters 9 and 10. 
Otherwise, our analysis will stick resolutely to those 
intermediate needs which must be satisfied if the basic needs for 
physical health and autonomy are themselves to be satisfied. 
Standards of basic need satisfaction 
     The next problem concerns the standards with which measures 
of need satisfaction are compared and shortfalls in need 
satisfaction calculated.  As regards basic needs, we have already 
made clear in Part II that we endorse neither  an absolute 
minimum standard nor a culturally relative one. The former cannot 
be drawn simply with reference to biological data, since our 
understanding of what it is possible to alter shifts - and 
typically expands - through time. The second would mean sliding 
back into culturally distinct and incomparable metrics which 
would negate our whole project. Instead, we propose a third 
standard - the optimum.  
     In Chapter 4 the optimum degree of basic need satisfaction 
is defined at two levels. At the first, health and autonomy is 
such that individuals can choose the activities in which they 
will take part within their culture, possess the cognitive, 
emotional and social capacities to do so or have access to the 
means by which these capacities can be acquired.  Let us call 
this the 'participation optimum'. At the second level, optimum 
health and autonomy is such that individuals can formulate the 
aims and beliefs necessary to question their form of life, to 
participate in a political process directed toward this end 
and/or to join another culture altogether. In neither case does 
optimum imply 'maximum', which is extremely difficult to 
operationalise as regards health and autonomy. In practice, the 
physical and mental health requirements for participating in a 
culture and for questioning and improving that culture will be 
the same. It is in the domains of cognitive understanding and 
social opportunities for participation that the two levels of 
optimisation diverge. The critical optimum will extend to embrace 
opportunities to acquire advanced knowledge of other cultures and 
to exercise political freedom as opposed to freedom of agency. 
Following the argument in Chapter 6, it is to need satisfaction 
at the 'critical optimum' level that all people have an 
entitlement.  
     What is required then is an aggregated social indicator of 
such 'critical optimum' levels of health and autonomy. In 
practice this can mean either the best level of need satisfaction 
achieved anywhere in the world at the present time, or a better 
standard than this which is materially feasible at the present 
time. Both standards raise complex issues concerning 
generalisability, the global politics of need and economic 
sustainability. For the time being we shall skirt around these 
problems. Using the term in the first sense, let us define the 
critical optimum according to the most recent standards achieved 
by the social grouping with the highest overall standards of 
basic need satisfaction. A variety of social categories could be 
used to delimit the best-off groups - social classes, income 
categories, racial groups, men as opposed to women - within or 
across countries. Thus how the optimum is operationalised will in 
part depend on the task at hand. In much of this book we shall 
use the social grouping which is most meaningful on a global 
scale - the nation state.  
     Our operationalisation of optimal need satisfaction, 
therefore, will be linked empirically to the actual performance 
of those nations with the highest levels of physical health and 
critical autonomy. There is a choice here between using different 
'best practices' drawn from different states - Japan for life 
expectancy, Sweden for economic security, and so on - or using a 
single nation which on average is the best performer. The latter 
has the advantage that this level of need satisfaction is 
demonstrably feasible and that any possible tradeoffs between 
different needs and between the needs of different groups of 
people will have been discounted [Naroll,1983, p.64]. Not only 
does 'ought' imply 'can'; 'is' implies 'can' too [Williams, 1987, 
p.96]. According to the data presented in Chapter 12, this 
country will be shown to be Sweden. 
     Of course,  for much of the Third World an optimum standard 
like this is unrealistic at the present time. Though such an 
optimum remains the only logical and moral criterion that can be 
applied to judge need satisfaction in the long term, this does 
not rule out lower standards being used as strategic goals in the 
short term. For less developed nations, lower positions can be 
derived by identifying those nations which achieve the best 
results at any level of (orthodoxly defined) economic 
development. In Chapters 12 and 13 we agree with those who argue 
that Costa Rica can serve as an exemplar nation for the 
midle-income countries of the Third World, and that before 1977 
and its present civil strife, Sri Lanka was a star performer 
among the poorest nations of the world. 
Standards of intermediate need satisfaction 
      Given the preceding arguments, the next stage is to 
determine the levels of intermediate need satisfaction - for each 
universal satisfier characteristic - which yield optimum levels 
of basic need satisfaction. This raises the question of how 
intermediate need 'inputs' are related to the 'outputs' of 
physical health and autonomy. We shall discuss this question in 
Chapter 10, but a more general observation can be ventured here. 
In a study of the impact of the environment on mental health, 
Warr develops a 'vitamin model' which we belive is applicable to 
this task. He notes that the availability of vitamins is 
important for physical health up to, but not beyond, a certain 
level:   
'At low levels of intake, vitamin deficiency gives rise to 
physiological impairment and ill-health, but after attainment of 
specified levels there is no benefit derived from additional 
quantities. It is suggested that principal environmental features 
are important to mental health in a similar manner' [Warr, 1987, 
pp.9-10 et seq; also Goldstein, 1985]. 
     This holds for physical health and other components of 
autonomy as well. In other words, a particular level of 
satisfaction for each intermediate need is required if human 
health and autonomy are to be optimised, but beyond that point no 
further additional inputs will improve basic need satisfaction. 
For example, the ratio of doctors to patients is positively 
associated with certain measures of survival and health in 
low-income countries, but not in high-income countries. This 
suggests that the effect of quantity of medical provision on 
physical health reaches its asymptote at some intermediate level. 
To take another example, once a dwelling is safe, warm, not 
overcrowded and supplied with clean water and adequate 
sanitation, no further improvements - in space, amenities, luxury 
fittings and so forth - will enhance the need satisfaction of its 
inhabitants as they pertain to housing. These improvements may 
well meet subjective desires and enhance the satisfaction of 
wants, but they are irrelevant to the evaluation of need-based 
welfare.  
     Warr goes on, however, to note that some vitamins have a 
contrary impact: in very large quantities they become positively 
harmful. These he calls AD components after the vitamins A and D 
(and conveniently acting as a mnemonic for 'additional 
decrements'). The same will be the case with some intermediate 
needs. For example, certain health-generating foods if eaten in 
excess can cause ill-health and become life-threatening. For 
these categories of satisfiers, there is a plateau of food 
consumption on either side of which too little or too much is 
harmful. The same is probably true of too much security in 
childhood and adulthood and some other satisfiers of intermediate 
needs. The two sorts of relationship are shown in Figure 8.1. 
Thus the crucial task in constructing indicators of need 
satisfaction is to ascertain the minimum quantity of intermediate 
need satisfaction required to produce the optimum level of basic 
need satisfaction measured in terms of the physical  health and 
autonomy of individuals. In the spirit of Rawls, we could call 
this level the minimum optimorum. It is apparent that this target  
combines the search for minima in satisfiers with the search for 
optima in outcomes, but that unlike other approaches which 
emphasize the importance of basic needs, it subordinates the 
former to the latter. For instance, if, on the basis of the best 
available knowledge, further improvements in education provision 
can enhance a population's physical health or critical autonomy, 
then it follows that their needs for education are not at present 
being optimally satisfied and that they should be regarded as in 
a state of objective deprivation.  
 
Figure 8.1 about here 
 
     A qualification must be made to this procedure in the case 
where universal satisfiers of intermediate needs are substitutes 
for one another, or  complement one another, within specified 
ranges of values. As an example of substitutibility, a warmer 
environment or reduced heavy labour will reduce the food 
requirements of humans [Cutler,1984, p.1121 et seq]. The evidence 
of complements between basic needs is strong: for example, female 
literacy contributes to health, nutrition, and lower fertility 
[Burki & Ul Haq, 1981, p.171 et seq; Stewart, 1985, ch.5]. More 
research is needed on all these relations and their linkages. 
Where either complements or substitutes exist, the minimum level 
of consumption of input A cannot be specified without knowing the 
level of consumption of inputs B, C, etc [Mallmann & Marcus, 
1980]. This apart however, all intermediate needs should be 
satisfied up to the minimum optimorum level. Where they are of 
the AD type, this should be below the point where additional 
decrements appear. 
     Another qualification concerns the ecological constraint to 
generalisability discussed in Chapter 7. It is conceivable that 
for some intermediate needs (particularly health and education 
services) the point at which provision ceases to enhance basic 
need satisfaction lies so far to the right on Figure 8.2 that the 
minimum optimorum position cannot be universally achieved with 
available resources. In this case a constrained optimum is called 
for, specifying the highest level of basic need satisfaction 
which is generalisable over the relevant population. A strong 
moral case was advanced in Chapter 6 for regarding the whole 
population of the world as the only relevant group when defining 
generalisability. This entails an operational notion of 
'sustainable' economic development, an issue which we tackle in 
Chapter 11. Again, however, in making actual strategic choices in 
the here and now, a less universal conception of the relevant 
population may well be the only feasible one. For all practical 
purposes, this will mean the populations of nation states which 
are representative of specific types of socio-economic 
constraints and which do well in relation to all the levels of 
individual need satisfaction.  
Problems in devising social indicators of need satisfaction 
     But what exactly does 'do well' mean in this context? We 
still  require valid and reliable 'social indicators' to assess 
the degree of success in meeting both our basic needs for 
physical health and autonomy, and the intermediate needs 
identified in Table 8.1. Yet, since all such indicators are 
surrogate measures - proxies for the strictly unmeasurable 
concepts which underlie them [Carley, 1982, p.2; Miles, 1985, 
p.16 et seq] - there will always be scope for proper debate about 
the suitability of any measure as an index of the satisfaction of 
any need. Let us consider the remaining problems identified in 
the literature under four headings. 
     1.Validity. How valid is 'calorie consumption per head as a 
proportion of FAO requirements' as a measure of 'adequate and 
appropriate nutrition'?  Is 'overcrowding' captured by a measure 
of 'proportion of people living at a density of more than two 
persons per room'? But there is always the danger of focussing on 
whatever happens to be easily measurable. Associated with this is 
the risk of substituting an 'input' for an 'output' or an 
'outcome'. An example of both dangers would be measuring 
'learning' by 'years attendance at school'. Of course, such a 
counsel of excellence risks paralysing all attempts to chart the 
human condition. In practice, when direct measurement is 
impossible, some 'translation' must be supplied which links the 
desired standard to the feasible measuring instrument [Carr-Hill, 
1984, p.183; Streeten, 1981, ch.21]. While we must learn from 
current best practice, our theory does offer some help. It 
defines a clear set of final outcomes - individual health and 
autonomy - from which intermediate 'inputs' can be derived. In 
this way it provides a theoretical rationale for accepting some 
commonly used social indicators (such as life expectancy), 
rejecting others (such as 'leisure') and identifying important 
lacunae (such as indicators of  'children at risk' or 'social 
isolation'). 
     2.Disaggregation and distribution. All compilers of social 
indicators must face the question of how far and how to 
disaggregate their data. Three broad alternatives can be 
distinguished, of which we shall use two (5). The first is to 
chart differences between individuals, for example by using the 
proportions falling below some benchmark (eg. below 2000 calories 
a day). Our theory focusses attention on absolute not relative 
differences, and in particular on the absolute standard of the 
worst off. Consequently, it endorses this sort of indicator 
rather than indicators of the average conditions of a group, such 
as life expectancy. Using this first method, different sets of 
individuals may fall below the benchmarks in different domains of 
need. The second method is to disaggregate measures of need 
satisfaction between groups which consistently score high or low 
marks. In Chapter 12 we shall present indicators of need 
satisfaction distingushing between women and men. 
     3.Composite indicators of well-being. Unlike national income 
per head the social indicators approach results in a messy 
profusion of domains of need, each often measured by more than 
one indicator. This has led to a search for a composite indicator 
which will capture well-being in a single figure. There are two 
approaches here.  
     The first entails weighting several indicators to form a 
single one. The 'Physical Quality of Life Index' is one such 
which has been much used in the development literature [Morris, 
1979]. The PQLI is a simple unweighted average of indices 
representing infant mortality, life expectancy at age one and 
basic literacy. Need satisfaction in these domains can be 
measured from the most minimal to an optimum defined in much the 
same way as we have done. So, infant mortality is ranked on a 
scale from, at one extreme, the worst national level recorded 
since 1950 to, at the other extreme, a 'best conceivable' level 
taking into account the present achievement of Sweden, the world 
leader. Similarly, life expectancy is scaled from the lowest 
recorded national level since 1950 to the likely average maximum 
assuming that  unforeseeable developments do not extend the  
normal human lifespan (77 years, two years longer than the then 
Swedish level). Weighted equally  alongside the percentage 
literacy rate these constitute the PQLI. 
     Unfortunately, this measure can be  criticised on  
conceptual as well as methodological grounds [Streeten, 1981, 
pp.387-90]. We have implied above that one domain of intermediate 
need satisfaction cannot be traded off against another (except 
where there is clear evidence of complementarity or 
substitutability). No amount of childhood security can compensate 
for lack of shelter today; nor can better nutrition offset a 
poisonous environment. Rather each domain should be assesed 
separately and evaluated according to the minimum or minimum 
optimorum standard. Furthermore, the PQLI endorses a minimalist 
notion of health and autonomy - acceptable for charting how badly 
we are doing but not capable of extending onwards to measure 
broader human progress. It also sidesteps the communicational and 
constitutional procedures without which progress towards optimal 
levels of need satisfaction is impossible. (6) 
     An alternative approach to the problem of aggregation [ 
Streeten,1981, pp.390-4] is to use average life expectancy or 
some other measure as the indicator of human development. Recent 
research suggests that it is highly correlatedwith doctors per 
head, calorie supply and even more robustly, with literacy 
[Stewart, 1985, ch.4]. Our theory explains why life expectacy is 
so crucial for any consideration of human need. However,  it does 
so by extending this focus on survival to a far broader concern 
with optimal physical health and personal autonomy. Unless a 
valid indicator of this entire syndrome is discovered, the 
problems of compositing more than one indicator will remain. 
Until then, social indicators are necessarily disaggregated. 
Though we should not foreclose the search for summary measures of 
human well-being, the idea of a single indicator (like GNP per 
head) will probably remain a search for the Holy Grail.  
     4.Who decides? Quantitative v. qualitative research into 
human needs. Lastly there is the perpetual dilemma facing 
research into needs. If it is agreed that both subjective 
preference and professional/bureaucratic dictate are suspect in 
determining what needs are and how they are measured, who is to 
decide on the appropriate social indicators and how?  The 
consensual answer to emerge in the last two decades is 
'participation' [Streeten, 1984, pp.974-5]. Effective and 
informed  participation on the part of the population whose needs 
are being assessed is vital, and has yielded impressive results 
at village level according to some studies [UNRISD,     ]. By 
itself, however, an emphasis on participation is  no panacea. 
Among other things, it can advantage the already-privileged 
through their ability to manipulate the information process and 
can sacrifice the common good to sectional interpretations of it. 
     Our approach offers some clues to overcoming this dilemma. 
We have already seen that our theory is essentially 'iterative': 
universal and objective needs can be shown to exist but the 
ongoing growth of knowledge continually modifies and improves our 
understanding of intermediate needs and how they can best be 
satisfied. This new knowledge in turn feeds back into and alters 
the indicators for the evaluation of social policies. The list of 
intermediate needs (eg nutritional food) and their appropriate 
universal satisfiers indicators (eg foods with specific 
nutritional content) is continually open to query and improvement 
as a result of the growth of codified and experiential knowledge. 
This applies a fortiori to the process of determining culturally 
specific satisfiers (eg specific types of food with particular 
nutritional content).  
     For the moment let us note that our theory endorses the use 
of both quantatitive and qualititative research methods [see 
Bryman, 1988, especially ch.6]. Except for the very smallest 
groups, the evaluation of need satisfaction must necessarily 
involve quantitative social indicators: numerical statistics 
which summarise conditions pertaining to groups of people. There 
are other advantages of such data, notably that they enable one 
to compute the degree of difference in need satisfaction between 
groups, or their rate of change over time. Nevertheless, this 
does not rule out a role for qualitative research in providing an 
understanding of the meaning of actions, and thus in devising and 
refining indicators of basic need satisfaction. Both quantitative 
and qualitative research have a role to play in deepening our 
understanding of what it practically means to meet human needs.  
But at any point in time it will be quantitative statistics to 
which one initially turns when charting  progress in this 
respect. 
 
     Starting with basic needs for physical health and human 
autonomy we have demarcated 'universal satisfier characteristics' 
- those characteristics of need satisfiers which are common to 
all cultures - and used these to determine categories of 
'intermediate needs'. The target   standard of satisfaction of 
each characteristic is the minimum necessary to secure optimum 
individual health and autonomy, in turn defined as the highest 
standard presently achieved in any nation state. Constrained 
versions of the optimum and the 'minimum optimorum' standard are 
also advocated for use in specific circumstances. To chart both 
basic and intermediate needs we ideally require social indicators 
which are valid, distributive, quantitative and aggregated, but 
which are open to revision. These indicators should be amenable 
to disaggregation between groups. In this way profiles of the 
need satisfactions of nations, cultural groups and other 
collectivities can be compiled. 
     Though all the above has been argued with respect to 
individual needs, the same process should be applicable to our 
societal preconditions. That is, we need to identify those 
societal preconditions which universally enable people rationally 
and democratically to identify and optimally satisfy their basic 





(1) Among the voluminous literature here, see Seers, 1979; 
Streeten, 1981, ch.18; Streeten et al, 1981, ch.1; Miles, 1985, 
ch.2; Hillhorst & Klatter, 1985; Leeson and Nixson, 1988, ch.2.  
 
(2) Weigel [1986] is exempt from these criticisms, but he bases 
his case on sociobiological arguments which, while interesting, 
are fundamentally flawed for the reasons developed in Chapter 3. 
 
(3) Braybrooke, 1987, ch.2.2. For comparisons of some of these 
taxonomies see Miles, 1985, ch.6; Baster, 1985;  
 
(4) As found in the work of Townsend [1979]. See also Mack and 
Lansley [1985], and, for a survey of many of the methodological 
issues, the contributions to a special issue of the Journal of 
Social Policy, 16, 2, 1987. 
 
(5) Carr-Hill, 1986, pp.305-6. The third alternative is to 
disaggregate between groups appropriate to the domain of need 
satisfaction under discussion. For example gender would be 
crucial when charting total work load, but not for physical 
environment.    
 
(6) The recently published  UNDP Report [1990] has constructed a 
Human Devlopment Index (HDI) along similar lines which has 
attracted a lot of attention. It combines life expectancy, 
literacy and income for a decent living standard (using as its 
measure of a 'desirable or adequate' level of the last the 
average official 'poverty line' in nine Western nations). It 
marks an advance on other indexes by developing a clearer 
theoretical formulation of human development as the formation of 
human capabilities and the use people make of their acquired 
capabilities for participating in various activities. This also 
clearly owes much to Sen's work and is similar to our own. 
However the HDI is still susceptible to the criticisms of all 
existing composite indexes outlined here. Such criticisms apply a 
fortiori to more complex, multi-faceted indices such as Estes' 
[1984] Index of Social Progress which combines together eleven 
subindices covering six dimensions of social progress using 44 
social indicators. Here, in the absence of a solid theoretical 
foundation, the huge weight of measurement threatens to topple 
the entire edifice.  
 
